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The Danish Presidency 2002: Completing the 
Circle from Copenhagen to Copenhagen 
Introduction 
In recent years we have seen an increasing interest in EU Presidencies, 
partly because the role of the Presidency has indeed increased. This in-
creased role is due to the expanding scope of integration as well as the wid-
ened membership of the EU. At the same time there has been a tendency to 
involve the European Parliament more in the decision-making process. 
These factors have contributed to making decision-making a more complex 
process. The Presidency’s main role is to ‘manage’ a multi-layered process 
of decision-making in an emerging polity. This involves – in cooperation 
with the Council Secretariat and the Commission – setting the agenda, ex-
ercising leadership – as a mediator and a policy entrepreneur – finding 
compromises, and representing the EU towards the external world, both in 
economic and political areas. 
Denmark held the Presidency during the second half of 2002. How much 
could it affect the agenda and the results? This question about influence is 
not an easy one. A Presidency can of course try to pull the integration proc-
ess in the direction it prefers, but it has to be careful not to be too partial. It 
has to a certain extent to anticipate the reactions of the other Member States 
to its ideas and proposals. In the end the Danish Presidency achieved much 
of what it set out to achieve, especially the completion of accession nego-
tiations with 10 applicant countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. Finn Laursen/ Berenice Lara Laursen 
 
Enlargement clearly was the main priority. The Danish Prime Minister An-
ders Fogh Rasmussen made it clear that he considered it to be of extreme 
importance to conclude enlargement negotiations by December 2002. He 
viewed the task of the Danish Presidency as a historical opportunity to 
“unify the European continent and to make a great area of stability, pros-
perity and security” (Agence Europe 28/06/02). He appealed to the Member 
States and the candidate countries to be flexible and explained that every-
one’s commitment was needed. “Ultimate success will require a willing-
ness to compromise by all parties”, he said (Denmark, 2002a, 32). 
Priorities 
As is customary the Danish government set out priorities in a work pro-
gramme prior to the start of the Presidency on 1 July 2002. The programme 
was entitled One Europe, suggesting already the emphasis the government 
put on enlargement (Denmark, 2002a). The five priorities were: 
-  From Copenhagen to Copenhagen
1 – Conclude enlargement nego-
tiation with up to 10 countries to enable them to become EU mem-
bers in 2004. To make progress in the negotiations with the coun-
tries not yet ready for membership and to strengthen relations with 
the EU’s new neighbours in the future. 
-  Freedom, security and justice – Joint fight against cross-border 
crime, including terrorism, illegal immigration, trafficking in 
women, narcotics crime and child pornography on the Internet. 11 
September 2001 had set a new agenda. In particular the war on ter-
rorism and implementation of the Seville decisions on political asy-
lum and immigration were given high priority.  
-  Sustainable development – To find the means to reconcile eco-
nomic growth and environmental protection. Efforts were needed 
 
1  The reference is to the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 
1993 when the decision was made that the applicant countries in Central and East-
ern Europe could become members of the EU in the future when certain conditions, 
the so-called Copenhagen criteria, were met. 
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‘to get more people into work and secure a durable economy while 
avoiding harmful tax competition and tax avoidance’. Results 
should be achieved both in ‘the EU and worldwide’. 
-  Safe food – Food safety – from farm to fork – was another priority. 
There was also a need ‘to reconsider the common agricultural pol-
icy so that we can continue developing it in a more market-oriented 
and green direction’. Further, a new fisheries policy taking into ac-
count fisherman’s interests and ensuring that in the future there are 
still enough fish in the sea was needed. 
-  Global responsibility – Fanaticism and poverty were seen as ‘the 
greatest threats to global security’. Given Europe’s tradition of de-
mocracy and respect for human right Europe had ‘a natural role and 
obligation to fulfil in the striving for peace and development’. Two 
events were singled out as especially important: The World Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, which offered ‘a 
good opportunity to promote global dialogue and understanding’, 
and the ASEM 4 summit in Copenhagen, ‘where relations between 
Asia and Europe will be further strengthened’. 
The Danish Presidency committed itself to transparency. ‘European citi-
zens and the media must be able to follow proceedings in the EU at close 
hand,’ said the government. The Danish Presidency implemented a number 
of reforms, created a website, provided agendas of Council meetings and 
gave public access to Council press briefings. 
A Euro-Sceptic Country 
Denmark is a hesitant member of the EU with a Euro-sceptical population. 
Denmark has opt-outs relating to the single currency, defence, citizenship 
of the Union, and supranational Justice and Home Affairs cooperation. 
These opt-outs go back to 1992 when the Danes first rejected the Maas-
tricht Treaty in a referendum on 2 June. The opt-outs were agreed at the 
meeting of the European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992 and sub-
sequently helped the Danish political elite to get the Maastricht Treaty ac-
cepted in a second referendum in May 1993 (Laursen, 1994).  
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The implications of the opt-outs are clear in respect to the euro and defence 
policy: Denmark does not take part. The exemption on citizenship does not 
mean much in practice. In respect to Justice and Home Affairs Denmark 
takes part in intergovernmental cooperation, but not supranational coopera-
tion. This exemption was reconfirmed when the Amsterdam Treaty moved 
a good part of Justice and Home Affairs from pillar 3 (intergovernmental) 
in the Union to the first pillar (supranational) (Laursen, 2002). And the ex-
emption got under increased pressure, as the EU decided at the Tampere 
summit in 1999 to speed up progress in these areas. 
The Danish scepticism was confirmed in 2000, when a majority of 53.1 
percent of the Danes rejected participation in the euro in a referendum 
(Laursen, 2003). Since the euro referendum on 28 September 2000 there 
has been very little debate about European integration, despite such debate 
being the declared objective of the government in the post-Nice period 
(Kelstrup, 2002). The election campaign leading up to elections to the Dan-
ish Parliament, the Folketing, on 18 November 2001 took place without the 
EU playing an important role in the debate. Immigration became the big 
issue in the election, with the centre-right winning on proposed restrictions 
in immigration and asylum policies. The Social Democratic-Social Liberal 
minority government under Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen had to 
resign. A new minority Liberal-Conservative Government under Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen was formed after the election. This current government 
depends on support from the anti-immigration and EU-sceptical Danish 
People’s Party for parliamentary survival. 
The Foreign Minister in this current government is Per Stig Møller from 
the Conservative Party. Bertel Haarder (Liberal) became Minister for 
European Affairs as well as Minister for Refugees, Immigration and Inte-
gration Affairs. The European Affairs portfolio was limited to the period 
before and during the Presidency. As a former MEP (1994–2001) and 
Vice-President of the European Parliament (1997–99) one of his assign-
ments was to keep the European Parliament informed during the Presi-
dency. 
  6  The Danish Presidency 2002 
How can a small euro-sceptic country like Denmark exercise effective 
leadership during a presidency? 
The government was partly aided by domestic political peace during the 
Presidency. The Presidency is seen as an important ‘national’ job. The op-
position therefore gave the government full support during the Presidency. 
In connection with the opt-outs – or exemptions, as they are called in Den-
mark – a special problem arose within the EU: Could Denmark chair 
Council meetings in areas where the country itself did not take part? 
An agreement was reached according to which Greece, which was sched-
uled to have the next presidency, would step into the Presidency in some 
situations. The arrangement based on a Danish report to the other Member 
States prior to taking over the Presidency is outlined in Agence Europe of 
the 2
nd of July 2002:  
-  Denmark will not preside in fora where topics are predominantly of 
a defence character, i.e. meetings of defence ministers (irrespective 
of the format for the meeting), meetings in the Military Committee 
and its subgroups and in other working groups that primarily dis-
cuss defence-related issues. 
-  Denmark will preside in fora dealing with topics of general ESDP, 
i.e. in the European Council, in the General Affairs Council, in 
PSC (Political and Security Committee) and in the traditional 
CFSP working groups. The report explains: “This will also apply in 
cases where elements relating to defence might enter the discus-
sion. However, if an agenda point in the General Affairs Council or 
in PSC related only to defence is dealt with, Denmark will refrain 
from presiding over the discussion on that particular agenda point. 
Denmark is naturally aware that in situations of crisis under all cir-
cumstances a decision can be made that the Secretary General/the 
High Representative will preside over meetings in PSC”. Similar 
guidelines will apply to exercises organised under ESDP. 
-  For meetings with international organisations or third countries the 
same principle will, as far as possible, apply, i.e. where topics are 
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predominantly of a defence character, Denmark will refrain from 
presiding. Denmark will not preside in relation to permanent co-
operation agreements with NATO, including at Council level, 
PSC/NAC level or any working groups between the two organisa-
tions. However, if a topic of generally non-defence character is 
death with, Denmark is willing to preside but it will not preside at 
meetings with the six European-allied non-EU countries nor with 
candidate countries concerning topics of a predominantly defence 
character, although it will preside over “other meetings with inter-
national organisations or general dialogue with third countries, 
even though elements touching on defence issues might be brought 
up”. (Agence Europe, 02/07/2002) 
It is clear from this that defence policy was the most affected area. When it 
comes to Economic and Monetary Union the 12 participants in the euro 
have their euro-12 Council, where the UK, Sweden and Denmark do not 
take part.  
Difficulties on the Road 
The main priority, as we have seen, was enlargement. The Danish presi-
dency wanted to conclude the negotiations with the applicant countries by 
the time of the Copenhagen summit in December. There were still out-
standing issues with the applicants, including especially financial issues. 
Enlargement would also make Kaliningrad a Russian enclave inside an 
enlarged EU, squeezed in between Poland and Lithuania. Would Russians 
in Kaliningrad need a visa to cross Lithuania to the main part of Russia? 
Among the candidates the division of Cyprus into a Greek and a Turkish 
part was also considered an issue. The EU clearly preferred a united Cyprus 
as future member and put pressure on the two sides – assisted by the UN – 
to find a solution. 
Turkey further complicated the issues by wanting a date for the start of ac-
cession negotiations. At the December 1999 summit in Helsinki Turkey 
had finally been accepted as a candidate country. But Turkey had problems 
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fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen criteria set up at the Copenhagen meet-
ing of the European Council in June 1993. These criteria were: 
-  Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respects for and protection of minorities 
-  The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the ca-
pacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union 
-  Ability to take on the obligations of membership including adher-
ence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union 
(Laursen, 2001, 208-209). 
On the EU side enlargement also depended on the ratification of the Treaty 
of Nice. But the Irish had rejected the treaty in a referendum in June 2001. 
Would they change their mind in a second referendum in the autumn of 
2002? If not, could enlargement take place without the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Nice? The Commission and the Danish Presidency claimed 
that this would not be possible and that there was no Plan B should the Irish 
vote ‘no’ again.  
The Costs of Enlargement 
At the Laeken European Council in December 2001 the Member States 
agreed on a list of ten countries to join the EU in time for the next Euro-
pean Parliament elections in June 2004. The countries were Cyprus, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Re-
public and Slovenia. Also it was the intention to continue negotiations with 
Romania and Bulgaria that are expected to join the EU by 2007. One of the 
main questions was “how much would the enlargement be allowed to 
cost?” (Denmark 2002b) 
Some financial aspects of enlargement were among the last issues to be 
solved in the negotiations. Here the two heavy policy areas, agriculture and 
regional policy, were the two with the biggest budgetary implications. The 
Commission’s proposed enlargement budget for the years 2004 to 2006 
was €40 billion, but not all member states accepted this figure. Concerning 
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the phasing in of direct payments to farmers in the new member states the 
Commission proposed a 10-year transition period, but this proposal met 
with criticism from some of the candidates that feared a ‘two-tier’ Europe 
(Brinkmann & Partners, 2002). 
Concerning the wider issues of CAP reform the Danish Presidency tried 
actively to delink these issues from enlargement. Speaking to the European 
Parliament on 3 July 2002 the Danish Prime Minister said that reform of 
the CAP “must be conducted independently of the enlargement negotia-
tions. We are not going to create new conditions for the enlargement” 
(Fogh Rasmussen, 2002). CAP reform is a difficult issue in the EU and al-
though enlargement is making it more urgent it will require time and in the 
end probably not be the kind of radical reform some economists would like 
to see.  
There were also some specific issues that remained to be sorted out for par-
ticular applicant countries. As in former enlargements the new member 
states were expected to take over the EU’s existing rules and regulations, 
the so-called acquis communautaire. Some of these issues included Esto-
nia’s possibilities for continuing its production of oil shale, a special energy 
resource extracted through mining, Malta’s wish to continue for some time 
to give state aid to certain industries, including shipyards, and Poland’s 
problems in meeting EU rules on border control (Denmark, 2002b). 
Kaliningrad: complications with the Russians  
A mayor concern during enlargement negotiations was how to proceed 
with negotiations over access to Kaliningrad and the complications it 
brought with the Russians. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov did 
not accept the Commission’s suggestion that frequent travellers could be 
issued a “Kaliningrad pass” to be accompanied by an internal Russian 
passport until the end of 2004. After that date an internationally recognized 
travel document would be required. France, Italy and Spain wanted the EU 
to commit itself to an assessment of how high-speed trains could be set up 
between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia, allowing non-stop, visa-free 
travel for Russian citizens via Lithuania. 
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The Danish Presidency had established a work programme for Russia that 
was endorsed by the Council on 22nd of July 2002. The common strategy 
had four main areas of cooperation with Russia.
2  
-  Promoting the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and 
public institutions in Russia: Focusing on present reforms of the 
judicial system 
-  Integration of Russia into a common European economic and so-
cial area:  
-  Support current work on the implementation of the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement, negotiations on Russian WTO 
membership, development of the Common European Economic 
Space 
-  Focus on energy questions including in the Kaliningrad Region 
-  Secure links between the priorities of the common strategy and 
the assistance to Russia by the EU and its Member States 
-  The issue of Chechnya was considered a central element in the 
work of promoting democracy in Russia. 
-  Cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and be-
yond: 
-  Continue the close cooperation in the fight against terrorism and 
on current international crises and crisis management 
-  Intensify efforts of cooperation on civilian crisis management 
-  Intensify the cooperation with Russia on and in the OSCE 
-  Secure Russian cooperation on conflicts in and between CIS 
Member States 
-  Addressing common challenges on the European continent 
 
2  Questions and answers: The Presidency work programme for Russia, EUROPA-
INFORMATIONEN, 6. August 2002,  
http://www.europa-web.de/europa/03euinf/10counc/russiawp.htm 
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-  Continue the cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs including 
fight against organized crime, trafficking and money laundering 
-  Open negotiations on a readmission agreement 
-  Focus on the Kaliningrad region 
-  Further development of the Northern Dimension 
-  Cooperation on environment 
An unexpected event was to create difficulties in the relations with the 
Russians. The Moscow Theatre siege by rebel Chechens in October threat-
ened to overshadow the EU dialogue with Russia. The EU-Russia Summit 
was moved to Brussels from Copenhagen because the Russians were angry 
at Denmark for hosting a Chechen Congress few days after the Moscow 
siege. At the time the Russians had requested extradition from Denmark of 
a Chechen rebel envoy, Akhmed Zakayev, but Denmark refused.  
The Summit took place on 11
th November 2002 and involved discussions 
on Kaliningrad, Justice and Home Affairs, fight against terrorism, trade and 
investment, energy and environment and nuclear safety. The EU and Rus-
sia reached an agreement on a solution for residents of Kaliningrad. The 
EU would introduce legislation to establish by 1
st July 2003 a Facilitated 
Transit Document (FTD) that would be issued free of charge or at a very 
low cost. The EU also promised to review the FTD scheme by 2005, a year 
after Lithuania, Poland and eight other countries in Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean were expected to join the EU.
3 Also an action plan on com-
bating terrorism was adopted. A joint declaration on the Middle East and 
the third report on the EU-Russia energy dialogue were also adopted. 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen disagreed with the Russian posi-
tion on Chechnya and said that the conflict was not just about terrorism. He 
said that a political solution should be found to secure peace. Putin said, 
“We’re in favour of it, but what we suggest is that we consider terrorism 
 
3  Joint  Statement  on  Transit  between  the  Kaliningrad  Region                             
and the Rest of the   Russian Federation 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_11_02/js_kalin.htm 
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and politics to be completely separate issues.” Rasmussen reiterated the 
European Union’s call for human rights to be respected, “Both sides must 
respect human rights, and those who don’t [must] be brought to trial with-
out delay” and he added, “The international community must be allowed to 
help the innocents caught in the conflict. Humanitarian assistance must be 
allowed into Chechnya to reach those in need.” Other EU leaders also 
raised their worries at the summit after Putin reiterated that he would not 
hold peace talks with Chechnya’s elected president, Aslan Maskhadov.  
The Danish Prime Minister seems to have handled the difficult situation 
very well. The External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, told the 
European Parliament Development Committee on the 12th November 
2002:  
“I have now been to seven Summit meetings between the EU and Russia, out 
of the ten which have been held so far…I have to say that no Presidency in my 
experience…has raised Chechnya as comprehensively and as vigorously as the 
Danish Prime Minister did yesterday… I have not been to a meeting with our 
Russian counterparts at this level, at which the subject has been raised in a 
more informed or more prolonged and comprehensive way than it was yester-
day... I would commend the Danish Presidency for the vigour and intelligence 
with which they have raised concerns about Chechnya while condemning out 
of hand terrorism.”
4 
Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice 
Given the agreement at the time of the negotiation of the Treaty of Nice 
that the treaty’s ratification was a precondition for the coming enlargement 
the non-ratification by the Irish was a problem. 
In a referendum in June 2001, where the turnout was only 34.79 percent, a 
majority of 53.87 percent of those voting opposed ratification of the treaty. 
A second referendum was to take place on the 19
th of October 2002 and 
polls indicated in September that only about 37% of the Irish voters in-
 
4  Declaration by The Rt Hon Chris Patten, CH at the European Parliament 
Development Committee 12 November IP/02/1655, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/ip02_1655.htm>  
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tended to vote. Of these 25% were opposed and 32 percent were undecided. 
The European Commission said publicly that enlargement would be at risk 
should Ireland fail to endorse the treaty (Lobjakas, 2002). Commission 
President Romano Prodi had said that an Irish ‘No’ vote would be a disas-
ter. There was no “plan B”. Enlargement negotiations could prove to be 
deadlocked (Agence Europe, 02/07/2002).  
It was then good luck for the Danes that the second referendum allowed 
Irish ratification. In the second referendum the turnout increased to 48.45% 
and there was a 62.98% ‘Yes’ vote. The Danish Prime Minister, President 
of the European Council, Anders Fogh Rasmussen considered that this 
‘Yes’ vote was a clear signal that “all EU countries take enlargement seri-
ously”. And he reminded us: “The Treaty of Nice is the enlargement 
treaty.” (Agence Europe, 22/10/2002) 
The ‘Yes’ vote was a victory for the Irish government and the pro-treaty 
campaigners (Tonra, forthcoming).  
We can only speculate whether a plan B could have been worked out 
quickly should the Irish have said ‘No’ a second time. But most likely a 
second ‘No’ would at least have delayed the enlargement negotiations, and 
the Danish Government would not have achieved its main goal during its 
Presidency. 
Divided Cyprus 
Concerning the membership of Cyprus the European Council at Helsinki in 
December 1999 had stated: “… a political settlement will facilitate the ac-
cession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached 
by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on 
accession will be taken without the above being a precondition. In this the 
Council will take account of all relevant factors” (Council, 1999). 
At Laeken in December 2001 the European Council welcomed the meet-
ings that had taken place between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot communities and encouraged them to continue their efforts to find 
a solution (Council 2001). 
  14  The Danish Presidency 2002 
At the Seville summit in June 2002 the European Council stated that its 
preference continued to be accession of a reunited island (Council 2002a). 
The effort of the UN Secretary General to assist the two communities in 
finding a settlement was encouraged. The Commission had also proposed a 
financial package to help overcome the economic disparities between the 
two parts of the island (Commission, 2002b, 25-27). 
During the Danish Presidency there were heavy pressures on the two sides 
on Cyprus to agree on reunification. 
The Turkish Issue 
The Turkish issue was especially difficult for the Danish Presidency. The 
EU Member States had rather diverse preferences, with some, including 
Italy and the UK, being in favour of a date for accession negotiations to 
start, but many other Member States feeling that such a date would be pre-
mature. 
Especially the political part of the Copenhagen criteria, democracy, rule of 
law, respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities, was a 
problem for Turkey. In its 2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress to-
wards Accession the Commission analysed a number of reforms adopted in 
Turkey recently (Commission, 2002a). “Overall, Turkey has made notice-
able progress towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria”, the 
Commission said.  
“Nonetheless Turkey does not fully meet the political criteria. First, the re-
forms contain a number of significant limitations (…) on the full enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Important restrictions remain, notably, to 
freedom of expression, including in particular the written press and broadcast-
ing, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion 
and the right to legal redress” (Ibid., 47) 
Secondly some of the adopted reforms still needed implementation. 
“Thirdly, a number of important issues arising under the political criteria have 
yet to be adequately addressed. These include the fight against torture and ill-
treatment, civilian control of the military, the situation of persons imprisoned 
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for expressing non-violent opinions, and compliance with the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights” (Ibid., 47). 
Achievements 
The Presidency has a number of jobs relating to the EU’s external relations. 
One of the bigger ones during the Danish Presidency was the UN Summit 
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. Later the 
ASEM 4 meeting in Copenhagen also required active involvement of the 
Danish Presidency. To that came a number of bilateral meetings as well as 
declarations on crisis situations in the world issued by the Presidency. 
UN Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 24 Au-
gust – 4 September 
At the Seville European Council on 21 and 22 June 2002 the Danish, Fin-
nish and Swedish Prime Ministers presented a joint draft for the Johannes-
burg Declaration “People, Planet and Prosperity – a Global Deal”, which, 
in an abbreviated version, formed part of the conclusions of the Seville 
Summit.
5  
The EU, which is strongly committed to sustainable development, took a 
leading role in preparations for the Summit in Johannesburg. The Union 
objective was to focus on six priority areas where poverty reduction and 
sustainable development come together. The six areas were water and sani-
tation, energy, health, trade and globalisation, global public goods and sus-
tainable consumption and production patterns. The EU also wanted clear 
targets and timetables in order to ensure that goals were met.  
At the Summit in Johannesburg on the 2
nd of September 2002 Prime Minis-
ter Anders Fogh Rasmussen, President of the EU, spoke on behalf of not 
only the European Union and its Member States but also on behalf of Bul-
garia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
 
 
5  Information at http://www.um.dk/english/wssd/eu.asp 
  16  The Danish Presidency 2002 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. He explained that the 
key elements in the European Union’s call for a global deal in Johannes-
burg were aid, trade, good governance and a better environment. He ex-
plained that the European Union had three messages in Johannesburg:  
1. The first priority should be to eradicate poverty through sustainable 
economic growth and increased market access, “We believe that a 
key factor towards a cleaner environment and sustainable develop-
ment is to raise standards of living in the developing countries…we 
can achieve this without detriment to our environment. Free trade 
and increased market access to all nations in the world is key to 
achieve this. ... Because – when trade advances, poverty retreats.”  
2. The second part of the EU message was: “the industrialized world 
must increase development aid and finance. More resources are 
needed. The richer countries should live up to their long-standing 
commitment to reach the 0.7 percent target for development assis-
tance. We must cooperate with the developing countries in order to 
improve education, health, public administration and services. We 
must fight HIV/AIDS and other major diseases. We must foster an 
environment where private initiative and business can thrive.”   
He stated that the European Union already provides the highest level 
of official development assistance to developing countries, “In the 
years until 2006 the EU will increase its development assistance with 
more than 22 billion Euros. And from 2006 onwards with more than 
9 billion Euros annually.” He added, “All countries should observe 
fundamental freedoms, democracy and rule of law… in order to cre-
ate the best conditions for business and sustainable growth. When aid 
and trade are linked to good policy, more people are lifted out of 
poverty.” 
3.  The third message concerned the environment: “If we don’t enhance 
the protection of our environment and ensure sustainable use of our 
 
6 http://www.pnltv.com/Denmark%20World%20Summit%2002 
 %20September%202002.htm> 
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natural resources all of our other initiatives will be wasted.” He ex-
plained that the EU has already ratified the Kyoto Protocol and 
stated, “We support the establishment of clear targets on water and 
sanitation, energy, biodiversity and chemicals. We support programs 
for sustainable consumption and production. A key challenge is to 
solve the serious problem of providing clean drinking water and 
sanitation to every village, town and city on the planet. This should 
be our primary goal.” 
4.  He concluded: “Growth and development are vital to us all – because 
it is only when people can feed themselves and their families, see 
their children go to school and grow up with a real future, and face 
life with a feeling of hope, that they too can afford themselves – the 
luxury of taking care of their forests, their air, their water and their 
food. Let us create this link between economic growth and protection 
of our environment.”
6  
The EU took a lead in Johannesburg but negotiations came to a deadlock 
when the US refused to contemplate binding targets for introducing renew-
able energy technologies like wind and solar power. There were also sug-
gestions that the Japanese and the Americans were negotiating behind 
closed doors over an exchange of access to clean water for Japan support-
ing a removal of renewable energy targets. CNN.com on August 30, 2002 
had a headline which said, “Earth Summit stalls on fine print” and ex-
plained “The European Union pressed on Friday to accelerate moves on 
contentious issues like sanitation goals and anti-corruption measures – tak-
ing them out of the hands of negotiators and sending them to top ministers 
to decide.” CNN quotes Hans Christian Schmidt, the Danish Environment 
Minister, as saying, “This just isn’t good enough…Either more issues are 
solved faster at the technical level or we must move them to the political 
level.” One of the problems was that Delegates were trying to reconcile 
American and European Union demands “for aid to be tied more clearly to 
efforts to improve human rights and democracy, and insistence by develop-
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ing nations that the rich states must do more to cut subsidies to their own 
farmers that help keep Third World imports out of their markets”
7.  
At the end the text adopted in Johannesburg included an “urgent” 
commitment to “substantially increase” the use of renewable energy 
sources but did not include targets sought by the European Union and some 
developing nations on the use of renewable sources such as wind and solar 
energy. The EU had wanted all countries to agree to increase global use of 
renewable energy sources to 15 percent by 2010. At the same time Canada 
and European Union succeeded in including a reference to “human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” alongside an existing phrase which said that 
medical access should be consistent with “cultural and religious values”. 
The fear was that without this reference to human rights women could be 
denied access to contraception and abortion and could be left prey to 
traditional practices such as genital mutilation. At the end the European 
Commission welcomed the results of the Johannesburg Summit but urged 
the world to turn the Summit agreement into concrete results. Still the 
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said in a news conference 
“I don’t think that mega-summits are the way to secure effective 
implementation.” (Rasmussen, 2002b) 
ASEM 4 
Maybe the biggest external relations job during the Danish Presidency was 
the 4
th EU-East Asia summit known as Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM 4) 
because it took place in Copenhagen, 23-24 September 2002. It included 
EU leaders and leaders from Japan, China, South Korea and six ASEAN 
countries. It started with an informal dinner Sunday 22 September in the 
evening at Kronborg Castle, Elsinore, where an informal political dialogue 
took place. It mainly dealt with recent regional developments. The official 
opening took place Monday morning. It was followed by the first formal 
session of Political dialogue: The international situation in the aftermath of 
September 11 and New Security Issues were discussed. Over lunch the 
 
7 CNN.com  http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/08/30/summit.eu.glb/ 
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leaders had a dialogue on Cultures and Civilizations. The second session 
Monday afternoon dealt with economic co-operation: Regional economic 
and financial priorities in the context of the global economic situation. The 
third session Tuesday morning dealt with social, cultural and educational 
issues: Human resources development and educational exchange: fostering 
mutual understanding, reducing poverty, increasing employability.
8 
In his opening speech the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
talked about interdependence and common concerns. He called ASEM “a 
unique process” unifying “more than two billion people from different civi-
lizations and cultures”. He went on: 
In the light of the tragic events of 11 September, the bridge-building role of 
ASEM is even more called for. We must firmly reject any attempt by extremist 
forces to divide the International Community on the basis of race, ethnic back-
ground or religious persuasion.
9 
In the economic section the Prime Minister talked about “the need for bet-
ter coordination to fight abuses of the global financial system”. He also said 
that it was necessary to “strive to achieve an even better framework for co-
operation to improve market access and investment conditions.” 
The Chairman’s statement issued after ASEM 4 summarised the discus-
sions. The leaders “underlined their resolve to fight international terror-
ism”. And they emphasised that “the fight against terrorism must be based 
on the leading role of the United Nations and the principles of the UN 
Charter”. A signal to the United States, one may ask? They decided “to es-
tablish an ad hoc informal consultative mechanism enabling ASEM Coor-
dinators and Senior Officials to confer expeditiously on significant interna-
tional events”
10. The Copenhagen summit also adopted a Declaration on 
 
8  The programme can be downloaded from: 
http://www.um.dk/asem/programUK_20020912.asp 
9  The speech can be downloaded from: http://www.um.dk/asem/aabningstateUK.asp 
10  The Chairman’s statement can be found at: 
http://www.um.dk/asem/erklæringUK.asp 
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Cooperation against International Terrorism as well as a Cooperation Pro-
gramme on Fighting International Terrorism.
11 
The summit further discussed Iraq. According to press reports the French 
president Jacques Chirac proposed that the meeting should adopt a political 
declaration, but this idea was pushed aside. There were disagreements both 
among the European and Asian partners on Iraq. On the European side the 
recently re-elected German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had spoken out 
against a military attack on Iraq. On the Asian side Prime Minister Mahatir 
Mohamad from Malaysia had never hidden his opposition against an attack. 
China’s Zhu Ronji is reported to have stated in the debate that Saddam 
Hussein must respect UN resolutions and allow weapons inspectors in.
12 
The leaders also said that ASEM “should serve to promote unity in diver-
sity”. They welcomed “the latest developments on the Korean Peninsula”. 
On the latter point they adopted a Political Declaration for Peace on the 
Korean Peninsula. In this they stated inter alia that “they hoped that the 
prospects for the resumption of dialogue between the United States and the 
[Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] DPRK would continue to im-
prove”
13. 
The EU gave wholehearted support to Kim Dae-Jung’s sunshine policy. 
The fact that the EU and South Korea has a serious conflict concerning 
South Korean state aid to the shipbuilding industry was not mention during 
the summit. It was however discussed in a bilateral EU-South Korea meet-
ing after the summit in the Danish Foreign Ministry. The meeting was not 
successful. Afterwards Commission President Romano Prodi vowed to 
keep pressing South Korea to abolish its support for the domestic ship-
building industry, which has created unfair competition for ship builders in 
Europe.
14  
 
11  Annexed to the Chairman’s statement. 
12  “Irak øverst på dagsordenen under ASEM-topmøde”, Børsen, 24 September, 2002, 
and Jesper Kongstad and Jørgen Ullerup, ”Styrket samarbejde  mod  terror”,          
Jyllands-Posten, 24 July 2002. 
13  Annexed to Chairman’s statement. 
14  Flemming Ytzen, “EU-opbakning til Korea”, Politiken, 25 September 2002. 
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In the section on closer economic partnership the ASEM leaders confirmed 
their commitment to enhance economic relations between the two regions 
while also expressing “their undiminished commitment to a strong, open, 
transparent and fair multilateral trading system, and agreed the WTO work 
programme launched at Doha represented a unique opportunity to promote 
economic growth to the benefit of their societies”. They were not specific 
in saying what progress they wanted. But they decided to ask ASEM coor-
dinators to set up “an action-oriented Taskforce” to consider the three areas 
of trade, investment and finance. This Taskforce should consist of five ex-
perts from each of the two regions. 
The Copenhagen summit also dealt with human resources development, 
social cohesion and environmental cooperation. The leaders stressed the 
role of education. 
A list of activities since ASEM 3 annexed to the Chairman’s statement in-
cluded about 65 meetings taking place at various levels and dealing with 
various issues. About 15 of these had dealt with trade facilitation (customs, 
standards, government procurements, e-commerce, veterinary controls and 
intellectual property rights enforcement) suggesting that ASEM is still bat-
tling with Non-Tariff Barriers to trade (NTBs). 
In his speech at the closing ceremony Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen 
said: “I have sensed an ‘ASEM spirit’ in our open, spontaneous and frank 
exchanges on the different items on our agenda.” The summit had “reached 
results of direct, concrete relevance for our peoples”
15. 
There was also an EU-China bilateral summit after the ASEM summit. Af-
ter that meeting the Danish prime minister said that the mature relation be-
tween the EU and China allowed for a discussion of issues where the two 
sides have different views, such as human rights. Indeed, at the bilateral 
meeting the EU expressed concern about human rights in China, especially 
the use of the death penalty, torture and suppression of ethnic minorities. In 
 
15 http://www.um.dk/asem/afslutUK.asp 
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a joint statement from the bilateral summit with China the EU supported 
the One China policy.
16 
The Brussels meeting of the European Council, 24-25 October  
In order to prepare the final EU offer on enlargement and decide about in-
terim institutional arrangements after enlargement an extraordinary Euro-
pean Council meeting took place in Brussels 24-25 October. 
Just prior to the summit the French President Jacques Chirac and German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder held a bilateral meeting, where they reached 
an agreement to maintain the financial framework of CAP until 2006 at the 
level decided in Berlin in 1999 and to start implementing an upper limit on 
agricultural spending from 2007 to 2013, taking account of inflation. The 
two leaders managed to reach an agreement on the phasing-in of direct aid 
for farmers in future member states for the 2004-2006 period. Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen hailed the agreement, but he also pointed out that this was an 
issue for all fifteen Member States (Agence Europe, 25/10/2002).  
The meeting of the European Council welcomed the positive result of the 
Irish referendum: “The result has paved the way for completing ratification 
of the Nice Treaty, thereby allowing the Treaty to enter into force early 
next year”, i.e. 2003. The meeting endorsed the recommendation from the 
Commission that the 10 candidate countries already singled out for mem-
bership fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and would be able to “assume the 
obligations of membership from the beginning of 2004”. The Union further 
reiterated “its preference for a reunited Cyprus to join the European Union 
on the basis of a comprehensive settlement” and urged “the leaders of the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to seize the opportunity 
and reach an agreement before the end of the accession negotiations”. Con-
cerning Bulgaria and Romania the European Council expressed its support 
for the two countries’ “efforts to achieve the objective of membership in 
2007”. And concerning Turkey the Union welcomed “the important steps 
 
16  Flemming Ytzen, “Verdens største handelsrute i sigte”, Politiken, 25 September 
2002. 
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taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria” which 
had “brought forward the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey” 
(Council, 2002b). 
At the meeting several decisions were made relating to the costs of 
enlargement. The ceiling for budgetary expenses agreed by the European 
Council in Berlin in 1999 for 2004-2006 had to be respected.  
First there was an agreement on the amount of funds that the candidate 
countries were to receive from the EU structural funds, namely 23 billion 
euros.  
Second a decision was reached on the phasing in of EU farm subsidies that 
the candidate countries will get as direct payments to the individual farm-
ers. Expressed as a percentage of the level of such payments in the Union 
the schedule would be: 2004: 25%, 2005: 30%, 2006:35% and 2007: 40%. 
Afterwards there would be “10% increments so as to ensure that the new 
Member States reach in 2013 the support level then applicable in the cur-
rent European Union”.  
Thirdly it was decided that the rules about own resources would apply to 
the new Member States. But this would make many of the new member 
states net contributors to the EU budget. So, “If the forecast cash flow bal-
ance with the Community’s budget compared to the year 2003 is negative 
for individual candidate States in the years 2004-2006, temporary budget-
ary compensation will be offered” (Council, 2002b). Or, as the Danes ex-
plained it, “no candidate country is to be in a poorer position after acces-
sion in relation to the EU budget that before, when they received support 
from the EU for their accession preparations” (Denmark, 2002b, 8). 
Concerning institutional issues the Brussels meeting decided that the 
weighting of votes in the Council for the period between accession and 31 
December 2004 would follow the current weights, with Poland getting 8 
votes (like Spain), the Czech Republic and Hungary 5 votes (like the Neth-
erlands, Greece, Belgium and Portugal), Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slo-
venia and Estonia 3 votes (like Denmark, Finland and Ireland), and Cyprus 
and Malta 2 votes (like Luxembourg). In EU-25 this would mean a total of 
124 votes, with a qualified majority vote being set at 88 votes. From 1 
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January 2005 the votes established by the Treaty of Nice and its attached 
declaration will apply, starting with 29 votes for the four biggest Member 
States and graduated down to 3 votes for Malta. In EU-25 this will give a 
total of 321 votes, and the QMV was set at 232. A QMV, as stipulated by 
Nice, will also include a majority of Member States, in some cases two-
thirds of the members. Further, a member may request verification that the 
Member States constituting the qualified majority represent at least 62% of 
the total population of the Union (Annex I, Council 2002b). 
The seats in the European Parliament for the period 2004-2009 will be 
based on the Declaration attached to the Final Act of the Nice Treaty. The 
50 seats which will not be taken up by Bulgaria and Romania “shall be dis-
tributed according to the provisions of the Nice Treaty”. “The total number 
of seats thus obtained shall be as close to 732 as possible.” But, “the appli-
cation of this method shall not result in any of the current Member States 
receiving a higher allocation of seats than at present” (Ibid.).  
After the Brussels meeting of the European Council Anders Fogh Rasmus-
sen said that the meeting was “crowned with success”. Referring to the 
prior agreement between France and Germany the Commission’s president 
Romano Prodi said, “I believe that it is my duty to praise the excellent 
Franco-German engine.” And he added a “special thank-you to France and 
Germany that allowed for this historic agreement to be formalised” 
(Agence Europe, 28/10/2002). 
It seems fair to say that the Franco-German agreement prior to the meeting 
was a great help for the Presidency. 
The reaction from the candidate countries, on the other hand, was one of 
disappointment (Agence Europe, 29/10/2002). 
The Copenhagen Summit, 12-13 December 
After the Brussels meeting of the European Council intense individual ne-
gotiations with the 10 candidate countries took place up to the meeting of 
the European Council in Copenhagen in December, where the final agree-
ment was reached about enlargement.  
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The Danish Presidency worked out its “final packages” during November. 
The Presidency’s proposals were criticized by both the current members 
and the future members. The Presidency admitted, “It was a rough recep-
tion on both sides, Member States and candidates. Reactions were more 
negative than expected.” Since the net cost of enlargement for the period 
2004-2006, according to the Danish compromise proposal, would be 1.3 
billion euro higher than calculated on the basis of the financial package 
agreed in Brussels the main ‘net contributors’ (Germany, United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Netherlands and France) found the Presidency’s offer too gener-
ous, while most candidates considered it largely inadequate (Agence 
Europe, 28/11/2002). 
At the summit intense negotiations took place especially with Poland about 
money and Turkey about a date for the start of negotiations about member-
ship. It was agreed that Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia would be able to 
join from 1 May 2004. For Bulgaria and Romania the EU set 2007 as the 
target date for accession (Denmark 2002b, 9).  
Concerning Turkey the Commission had concluded in its annual report in 
October 2002 that progress was being made towards fulfilling the political 
Copenhagen criteria – requirements for democracy, protection of minorities 
and the rule of law – but that the country did not fully meet these criteria. 
Turkey was pressing for a date. In the end, Copenhagen at least offered a 
date for a decision. The Commission will present a report to the European 
Council in December 2004 and make a recommendation concerning Tur-
key’s fulfilment of the political Copenhagen criteria. If the European 
Council decides then, on the basis of the Commission report, that Turkey 
fulfils the criteria the EU will initiate accession negotiation with Turkey 
‘without delay.’ It was also decided to increase pre-accession financial as-
sistance to Turkey (Denmark 2002b, 10). 
The Turkish leaders present in Copenhagen were not satisfied. Their US 
ally had also put pressure on the EU leaders, with President Bush person-
ally calling some of them, including Anders Fogh Rasmussen.  
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Concerning new neighbours the summit expressed its willingness to im-
prove relations to create stability, progress and close co-operation, men-
tioning in particular Russia. But a new neighbour’s policy was also pro-
posed for Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The possibility of future mem-
bership for countries in the Balkans was confirmed. 
At the start of the summit the Presidency tried to get a final agreement with 
the other Member States about the final financial offers to the candidates. 
The Fifteen approved various “packages” proposed by the Presidency while 
insisting that the financial offer was “at the limit of budgetary resources”, 
as Anders Fogh Rasmussen expressed it in a press briefing. According to 
the compromise formula Poland would benefit in 2005 and 2006 of a new 
additional budget facility (cash-flow facility) of 1 billion euro (550 million 
in 2005 and 450 million in 2006) to allow the Polish authorities better to 
manage their budgetary difficulties during the first three years of member-
ship. At the same time Poland would lose 1 billion euro in revenue in the 
long term under the Structural Funds. In reality therefore this was a money 
transfer within the budget, which would not increase the total costs to the 
EU budget (Agence Europe, 14/12/2002). 
 
Table 1: Maximum enlargement-related appropriations for commit-
ments (mio. Euros 1999 prices) 
2004-2006 (for 10 new Member States) 
  2004  2005  2006 
Heading 1 Agriculture 
Of which: 
1a – Common Agricultural Policy 
1b – Rural development 
1.897 
 
327 
1.570 
3.747 
 
2.032 
1.715 
4.147 
 
2.322 
1.825 
Heading 2 Structural actions after capping 
Of which: 
Structural fund 
6.095 
 
3.478 
6.940 
 
4.788 
8.812 
 
5.990 
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Cohesion fund  2.617  2.152  2.822 
Heading 3 Internal Policies and additional 
transitional 
expenditure 
Of which: 
Existing policies 
Transitional Nuclear safety measures 
Transitional Institution building measures 
Transitional Schengen measures 
1.421 
 
 
882 
125 
200 
286 
1.376 
 
 
917 
125 
120 
286 
1.351 
 
 
952 
125 
60 
286 
Heading 5 Administration  503   558  612 
Total Maximum Appropriations for commit-
ments 
Heading 1, 2, 3 and 5) 
9.952 12.657  14.958
 
Annex I to the Presidency conclusions outlined the financial part of the 
agreement based on accession of 10 new Member States by 1 May 2004. 
Table 1 shows the maximum appropriations for the remaining years of the 
current financial framework agreed in Berlin in 1999. 
Further, the Copenhagen summit agreed on a special lump-sum cash-flow 
facility for the year 2004 and for temporary budgetary compensation for the 
years 2004 to 2006. The total amounts agreed are shown in table 2. 
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Table 2: Heading X (special cash-flow facility and   
(mio. Euros 1999 prices) temporary budgetary compensation) 
2004-2006 (for 10 new Member States) 
  2004  2005  2006 
Special cash-flow facility 
Temporary budgetary compensation 
998 
262 
650 
479 
550 
346 
 
A number of other issues were dealt with during the end-game, including 
Polish milk quotas, zero level VAT on medicines and foodstuffs for Malta 
until 2010, 5-year restriction on Czech heavy-goods vehicles in the EU and 
nuclear safety (the Temelin and Ignalina nuclear reactors), etc. 
Afterwards Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated: “I have to admit – during the 
afternoon, I went through very tough negotiations with some Prime Minis-
ters and managed to get my EU15 partners to accept some concessions. I 
did not really doubt, but things seemed long and hard. It’s incredible that 
we finally managed to conclude before midnight.” And he went on: “I may 
have been rough and tough this afternoon (…), but I believe that everyone 
will forgive me because we seized this historic opportunity to reunite 
Europe” (quoted from Agence Europe, 16/12/2002). 
According to Commission President Romano Prodi the Copenhagen result 
was a “great personal success” for the Danish Prime Minister (Agence 
Europe, 19/12/2002). 
Evaluations 
The Danes were self-congratulatory after the Presidency. The official re-
port on the Presidency talked about carrying out the historic task of com-
pleting accession negotiations. “With this, the vision of one Europe has be-
come reality.” 
But many other results had been achieved during the Danish Presidency, 
including for instance: 
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-  Liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets in the EU, a step 
that will lead to lower prices for consumers and companies. 
-  The establishment of a single European airspace, the Single Euro-
pean Sky, which simplifies air traffic control in Europe and leads to 
fewer cancellations, shorter waiting time and safer air transport. 
-  The adoption of new rules on food safety, which provide greater 
safety for consumers, which again means that fewer will fall ill 
with bacterial food contamination (Denmark, 2002b, 3) 
In a speech to the European Parliament after the Copenhagen summit An-
ders Fogh Rasmussen also mentioned these results: the Dublin II agreement 
on asylum, the agreement on CO2 emission exchanges, solidarity with 
countries flooded last summer, common rules on GMO labelling, and the 
solution to the Kaliningrad problem (Agence Europe, 19/12/2002). 
The Danes argued that the Presidency has two main tasks, getting the work 
done and creating specific results. In respect to the latter, it was said that 
the Presidency “must be ready to conduct marathon meetings, apply pres-
sure on Member States and be able to present creative proposals at the right 
time and in the right place. This requires preparation, focus and solid 
craftsmanship”. According to the Danish report, the Danish Presidency had 
discharged these tasks “beyond the call of mere duty” (Denmark 2002b, 4). 
Transparency was also mentioned in the Danish report as an area with spe-
cial achievements. Based on the decisions of the Seville European Council 
in June 2002 the Danish Presidency had implemented a number of reforms 
to produce more transparency. This included open, televised Council meet-
ings. The following statistics were presented: 
-  With more than 25 open Council debates, the Danish EU Presi-
dency has held more open debates than any previous EU Presi-
dency. 
-  With 1.3 million visitors, the Presidency website, www.eu2002.dk, 
is the most visited EU Presidency website so far. 
It was also claimed that the work in the Council had become more stream-
lined “with fewer but stronger Council configurations,” and “the meetings 
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of the European Council have been better prepared and the agenda drawn 
up to focus on fewer and more overall items” (ibid., 5). 
Concluding remarks 
Measuring the success of a presidency is not an easy task. The success rate 
depends on expectations. But if one compares the results of the Danish 
Presidency with the priorities established at the outset the Danish Presi-
dency was indeed a success. This is also the evaluation of some scholars. 
At a Round Table discussion at Aarhus University on April 28, 2003, both 
the Swedish scholar Magnus Ekengren and British scholar Lee Miles spoke 
favourably of the Presidency. According to Ekengren the emphasis had 
been on sticking to the time schedule, whatever happened. The Presidency 
succeeded in linking the political layers within the individual member 
states as well as on the European level. The Presidency succeeded in recon-
ciling national interest with the common interest (Wehmüller, 2003, 20-
21). 
Miles said that the claim that smaller states due to a lack of resources are 
unfit to run a presidency needs to be abandoned. Small states appear less 
threatening than large states and can have considerable goodwill. “Pragma-
tism rather than visions seemed a particular good characteristic of the Dan-
ish Presidency.” “Pragmatic and instrumental leadership has been at the 
helm of the Danish EU Presidency.” (ibid, 22-23) 
At the same round table Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, one of the chief advi-
sors of the Danish Prime Minister during the Presidency, also spoke of the 
Presidency as a success. He mentioned “the Presidency’s ability to shape 
the expectations of the negotiating partners” as a factor. “In committing 
itself to a principle of credibility, the political team behind the Danish 
Presidency had agreed to keep a steady course while at the same time have 
the guts to choose a decision when needed. The Danish Presidency showed 
on the one hand a willingness to listen and on the other to eventually go 
along on its own agenda when needed.” (quoted from ibid, 19) But he also 
admitted that there were two external factors beyond the control of the 
Danish Presidency: the risk that the Iraqi crisis might have exploded during 
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the Copenhagen summit and that the Irish might have voted ‘no’ to Nice a 
second time.  
A successful Presidency thus requires good luck as well as help from part-
ners. The Franco-German agreement on CAP financing 1994-96 consti-
tuted such help from partners during the Danish Presidency. 
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